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PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN COVID-19-ERA
CIVIL TRIALS
Justin Sevier*

The COVID-19 pandemic has altered the lives of millions of people
worldwide. American courts have not been immune to the hardships
created by COVID-19, and legal authorities have been placed in the
difficult position of determining how to provide justice to civil litigants
while keeping participants in the legal system safe from the coronavirus.
Initially, many courts decided to suspend civil trials until the virus
was contained or until adequate mitigation measures became available.
As the pandemic dragged on, however, several courts turned to innovative solutions to continue resolving civil disputes. Some courts have
opted for “sterilized” in-person trials, in which courts allow for sufficient space to practice social-distancing, require face coverings, and include plexiglass barriers in the courtroom, among other innovations. A
select few courts have opted for a bolder solution: to hold jury trials
entirely over Zoom videoconferencing software.
Most of the early commentary on these procedural innovations has
focused on the implications for the accuracy and quality of decision
making that arises from them: For example, the degree to which jurors
pay attention to proceedings on Zoom or the extent to which a masked,
in-court witness’s demeanor can be evaluated. This Article takes a different approach to these pandemic-era procedural innovations by examining the extent to which the public (1) legitimizes the tribunals that
employ them; and (2) perceives that these tribunals treat litigants fairly.
Adequately understanding the extent to which jurors legitimize these
COVID-19-era innovations requires understanding the ways in which
they differ from normal civil trials. To that end, this Article employs
construal level theory, a modern psychological theory that examines the
effects of distance on people’s perceptions of their social surroundings—either by attending court masked, separated from others, or
through plexiglass barriers; or by attending court on one’s computer
miles away from the courthouse.
To that end, this Article is a call for empirical research on public
perceptions of procedural justice in COVID-19-era civil trials. This Ar* Charles W. Ehrhardt Professor of Litigation, Florida State University College of Law.
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ticle examines how popular conceptions of procedural justice may be
moderated by perceptions of psychological distance. It then suggests
several avenues through which researchers can study the feasibility of
COVID-19-era procedural innovations as they impact perceptions of
legal legitimacy throughout the pandemic and beyond.
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I. INTRODUCTION: THREE CIVIL PLAINTIFFS
A. Phillip White
Vineland, New Jersey, resident Phillip White had been leaning
against a fence when officers from the local police department responded to a report of a disturbance at the 100 block of West Grape
Street around 11:00 in the morning on March 31, 2015.1 White was
allegedly high on phencyclidine, commonly known as PCP, and apparently had been attempting to recover property from an area homeowner.2 Eyewitnesses reported that White had been shouting at the
homeowner to return the property before he eventually calmed down,
apologized, and walked over to the fence.3
When the officers approached White at the fence, he began
hyperventilating and, according to the officers, began pounding on
their vehicle that contained their K-9 police dog.4 The officers alleged
that White became uncooperative, resulting in a struggle in which
White was forcefully taken to the pavement.5 Although disputed by
several eyewitnesses to the encounter, the officers claimed that White
attempted to grab the holster of one of the officers, which resulted in
the officers repeatedly striking White in the face and releasing the police dog from their patrol car.6 White sustained injuries in the melee
and was arrested.7 He was placed in an ambulance, where he then
suffered a heart attack.8 He was pronounced dead on arrival at the
local hospital.9
Further investigation revealed that one of the officers involved in
the altercation had faced seventeen prior excessive-force complaints
(and another twenty-nine complaints that have been filed since the
incident with White),10 in a department that had investigated 185 of
1. Don E. Woods, Cops Cleared After Suspect Died in Their Custody, N.J. Grand Jury Rules,
NJ.COM (Jan. 16, 2019, 9:58 PM), https://www.nj.com/cumberland/2016/06/cops_cleared_after_
suspect_died_in_their_custody_n.html; Joseph P. Smith, Vineland, Police Sued for $10M by Family of Phillip White, THE DAILY J. (Nov. 7, 2016, 6:15 PM), https://www.thedailyjournal.com/
story/news/2016/11/07/new-jersey-vineland-federal-district-court-phillip-white-lawsuit-march2015-death/93450332/.
2. Woods, supra note 1.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Smith, supra note 1.
7. Woods, supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. Id.; Smith, supra note 1.
10. Tracey Tully, Judges Juggle Over 2,700 Cases Each as Families Wait for Day in Court, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/17/nyregion/federal-court-njjudges.html.
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190 recent excessive force complaints against its officers and found
that no violations had ever occurred.11 After a grand jury declined to
indict the officers involved in the altercation, White’s family commenced a federal civil rights lawsuit against the officers and the city of
Vineland, seeking over $10 million in compensatory and punitive
damages.12
The lawsuit was filed in November 2016 and remains unresolved at
the time of this writing.13 In a stinging rebuke of the officers’ motion
for summary judgment, Judge Joshua D. Wolson called their attempt
to quash the lawsuit a “bold display of chutzpah” insofar as the case
involved “[m]ore than a dozen potential witnesses, inconclusive video
footage and dueling experts,” among other factors weighing in favor
of a jury trial.14 Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, inperson civil jury trials were suspended in New Jersey federal courts
from March 16, 2020, through at least September 1, 2021, with criminal cases prioritized upon reopening.15 Moreover, because of additional staffing shortages on the District of New Jersey bench, the
White family’s lawsuit was reassigned to a federal court in Pennsylvania, where the family hopes to eventually resolve the case.16
When asked for comment by a reporter with respect to the status of
the family’s lawsuit, their attorney noted that because the family is
required to stay in contact with the Vineland Police Department until
the case is resolved, “it rubs on a wound that we haven’t let heal.”17
B. Cheryl Staple
Desmond Staple, an attorney who specialized in insurance and
healthcare litigation, was found unresponsive in his vehicle near the
center aisle of a Walmart parking lot just outside of Tampa, Florida, in
11. Jim Walsh, Witness Challenged Over Account of Vineland Man’s Arrest, THE DAILY J.
(May 3, 2021, 10:10 AM), https://www.thedailyjournal.com/story/news/2021/05/03/phillip-whitevineland-police-death-lawsuit/4904261001/.
12. Cyril Josh Barker, Police Officers Not Indicted in Phillip White Death, AMSTERDAM NEWS
(June 23, 2016, 1:56 PM), http://amsterdamnews.com/news/2016/jun/23/police-officers-not-indicted-philip-white-death/; Smith, supra note 1.
13. Tully, supra note 10.
14. Id.
15. See In Re: Court Operations Under the Exigent Circumstances Created by COVID-19
(Standing Order 20-02, Mar. 16, 2020); see also In Re: Court Operations Under the Exigent
Circumstances Created by COVID-19 (Fourth Extension of Standing Order 2020-12) (May 19,
2021).
16. The district court has tentatively scheduled a trial date for October 3, 2022. Scheduling
Order at 2, White v. City of Vineland, No. 1:16-cv-08308-JDW-KMW (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2022).
17. Tully, supra note 10.
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March of 2016.18 The medical examiner attributed his death to the
fifty-six grams of aspirin and acetaminophen found in his bloodstream, akin to having ingested 112 pills.19 In the year before his
death, Desmond and his wife Cheryl had been paying premiums to
Northwestern Mutual on three term life policies and one whole life
policy with combined benefits of approximately $4 million.20 When
Cheryl Staple attempted to collect the death benefits, however, Northwestern Mutual denied her claim.21
Northwestern Mutual alleged that Desmond Staple had died by suicide, and under the terms of the policies, if an insured commits suicide
within the first year of coverage, then beneficiaries are entitled only to
a return of the premiums with interest.22 Cheryl Staple, however, contended that her husband died as a result of an accidental overdose,
and she sued the insurance company in December of 2017.23 Following lengthy discovery with no resolution to the case, Staple and Northwestern Mutual prepared for trial.24
Unlike Phillip White’s family and the Vineland Police Department,
Cheryl Staple and Northwestern Mutual did get their day in federal
court, but with a twist: Neither of them were physically present in the
courthouse for the trial.25 Instead, the binding civil jury trial was held
entirely over the Middle District of Florida’s Zoom videoconferencing
software.26
The trial lasted five days and included two practice runs.27 Each
juror logged into the trial from her home; heard testimony from several fact witnesses and experts regarding Desmond Staple’s final days
before his death; and evaluated what one reporter described as heartbreaking surveillance footage, dueling medical examiner reports, and
18. John Hilton, Northwestern Mutual Wins $4M Zoom Trial after Jury Rules Suicide, IN(Feb. 2, 2021), https://insurancenewsnet.com/innarticle/northwesternmutual-wins-4m-zoom-trial-after-jury-rules-suicide; Raychel Lean, A Lawyer’s Death and $4M
Policy: Inside Florida’s First Federal Remote Civil Jury Trial, LAW.COM (Feb. 18, 2021, 2:41 PM),
https://www.law.com/dailybusinessreview/2021/02/18/a-lawyers-death-and-4m-policy-insidefloridas-first-federal-remote-civil-jury-trial/.
19. Lean, supra note 18.
20. Hilton, supra note 18.
21. Id.; Lean, supra note 18.
22. Lean, supra note 18.
23. Id.
24. The discovery period lasted nearly three years. See Docket Report, Staple v. Northwestern
Mutual Life Insurance Co., No. 8:17-cv-03066-MSS-TGW (Dec. 21, 2017), retrieved Jan. 14, 2022
(via PACER).
25. Lean, supra note 18.
26. Id.
27. Id.
SURANCENEWSNET.COM
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text messages that had been admitted into evidence.28 After the fiveday trial, the jury deliberated for thirty-two minutes before returning
a verdict for Northwestern Mutual.29
When reporters asked whether the verdict would have been different in an in-person proceeding, Cheryl Staple’s attorney noted that
answering the question would be “pure speculation,” but expressed
surprise that the jury ignored what he contended was persuasive evidence of an accidental overdose and that the jury deliberated for only
a half hour.30 He concluded that he “[does] not believe our judicial
system is prepared for Zoom trials, until more information about how
juries may respond to this new environment is known.”31
C. George Willette
In August of 2019, George Willette filed a medical malpractice suit
against his doctor and a Medford, Oregon hospital for what he
claimed was negligent treatment of a diabetic condition, resulting in
the loss of the plaintiff’s limbs.32 After completing discovery and with
neither party offering a settlement, the case proceeded to trial in the
fall of 2020.33
The week-long, in-person trial was scheduled for early November
2020.34 The proceedings, however, did not take place as they normally
would in the Jackson County Courthouse.35 Instead, the case was tried
in the auditorium of Central Medford High School, where court administrators could enact better safety protocols to mitigate the spread
of COVID-19 while reducing the court’s civil case backlog.36 The
dimly-lit auditorium allowed for substantial spacing for the judge, litigants, bailiffs, witnesses, and the fifty-nine jurors who were summoned for voir dire.37 Court personnel frequently sanitized chairs,
28. Id.; Hilton, supra note 18.
29. Lean, supra note 18.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See generally Complaint, Willette v. Providence Health and Services Or., No. 19CV37545,
2020 WL 7773565 (Or. Cir. Nov. 24, 2020).
33. Ambar Rodriguez, Jackson County Circuit Court Hosts its First Post-COVID-19 In-Person
Civil Jury Trial, KTVL NEWS 10 (Nov. 5, 2020), https://ktvl.com/news/coronavirus/jacksoncounty-host-its-first-post-covid-19-in-person-civil-jury-trial; see also Statement from George Willette’s attorney in response to inquiries (May 19, 2021) [hereinafter Statement from George Willette’s attorney] (on file with the author) (describing the Willette dispute as a “zero offer case”).
34. Rodriguez, supra note 33; see also Statement from George Willette’s attorney, supra note
33 (noting that the trial began on Monday, November 3, 2020, and concluded on Monday, November 10, 2020).
35. Rodriguez, supra note 33.
36. Id.
37. Statement from George Willette’s attorney, supra note 33.
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equipment, and other surfaces, and the witness stand and counsel tables included plexiglass partitions.38 All participants wore facial
coverings.39
Once the twelve-person jury was selected, jurors were allowed to
spread out as far as they desired in the auditorium.40 The judge and
his clerks sat on the stage, while the litigants and their attorneys were
seated below the stage in front of the jurors, some of whom were up to
100 feet away, examining exhibits on two ill-fitted LED monitors on
opposite ends of the stage.41 After hearing from several in-person witnesses and two witnesses via videoconferencing software (which malfunctioned several times on the second day of trial), the jury rendered
its verdict for the defendant hospital.42 In a statement, the attorney for
George Willette expressed reluctance to try a legal case “in a high
school auditorium, or a fair grounds, or a hotel ballroom, or a bull
fighting ring” in the future and expressed a preference for Zoom instead.43 The presiding judge, however, enthusiastically told reporters,
“[w]e’ve made history.”44
D. The Tie that Binds
George Willette, Cheryl Staple, and Phillip White’s family initiated
very different civil claims—a medical malpractice suit, a breach of
contract action, and a federal constitutional tort suit, respectively—
but with an important commonality. Each action is set against the
backdrop of the deadliest global pandemic in over a century, which
currently has killed nearly 874,000 Americans and has infected over
eighty-three times that amount.45 Issues of access to the civil justice
system—including the expense of discovery and lengthy wait times
from the filing of the complaint until trial—have long concerned
scholars and policymakers interested in the efficiency of the civil
38. Jennifer Oetter Secures Victory in First Civil Jury Trial in Oregon Since the Pandemic Began, LEWIS BRISBOIS (Nov. 17, 2020), https://lewisbrisbois.com/newsroom/news/jennifer-oettersecures-victory-in-first-civil-jury-trial-in-oregon-since-the-pandemic [hereinafter Jennifer Oetter
Secures Victory] (noting that witnesses “sat in a witness box with a plexiglass partition” and that
“[t]here was a plexiglass divider between” defense counsel, her client, and her media specialist).
39. Jennifer Oetter Secures Victory, supra note 38.
40. Statement from George Willette’s attorney, supra note 33 (referencing attorney
statement).
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Rodriguez, supra note 33.
45. See COVID Data Tracker, CDC, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#datatrackerhome (last visited Jan. 27, 2022).
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courts and in legal institutional design more generally.46 As I discuss
further in this Article, the public health measures that have been
taken to mitigate the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic have the potential to exacerbate these concerns.
State and federal courts routinely use their local rules to innovate
civil and criminal jury trial procedures, and this appears to be true
during the pandemic.47 Specifically, federal and state courts have chosen three paths through which to effectuate civil justice in a time of
COVID-19: (1) wait out the pandemic and return to in-person civil
trials when it is safe to do so, even if that may delay trials for months
or years; (2) hold civil jury trials in person without delay, but with
extensive precautions, including temperature checks of participants,
masks, social distancing, and plexiglass barriers, among others; or (3)
hold civil trials virtually over Zoom or other group videoconferencing
software, in which the presiding judge, jurors, and parties attend the
proceedings from their homes without the need for in-person precautions against the virus.48
Much of the early research and commentary examining these pandemic-era procedural innovations has focused on the degree to which,
for example, the wearing of masks and the presence of plexiglass barriers affect perceptions of witness credibility.49 Implicit in this line of
inquiry is a concern that inaccurate decisions will result not only in
miscarriages of justice with respect to individual litigants, but also in a
discrediting of the justice system among the public.50 This is important
46. See, e.g., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, CALL TO ACTION: ACHIEVING CIVIL JUSTICE
ALL 2 (2016), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0029/19289/call-to-action_-achieving-civil-justice-for-all.pdf. The National Center for State Courts has described these important
concerns this way:
Americans deserve a civil legal process that can fairly and promptly resolve disputes for
everyone—rich or poor, individuals or businesses, in matters large or small. Yet our
civil justice system often fails to meet this standard. Runaway costs, delays, and complexity are undermining public confidence and denying people the justice they seek.
Id. at 2.
47. E.g., B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona Experience, 79
JUDICATURE 280 (1996) (discussing reforms to local court rules in Arizona); see also Justin Sevier, The Unintended Consequences of Local Rules, 21 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 291, 301–03
(2011) (discussing local court rules in the context of a psychology study examining the effects of
jury notetaking).
48. See infra Part IV.B.
49. E.g., Julia Simon-Kerr, Unmasking Demeanor, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 158,
160–61 (2020).
50. For a discussion of the role that decisional accuracy plays in legitimizing public perceptions of the legal system, see Tom R. Tyler & Justin Sevier, How Do the Courts Create Popular
Legitimacy?: The Role of Establishing Truth, Punishing Justly, and/or Acting Through Just Procedures, 77 ALBANY L. REV. 1095, 1127 (2013-2014) (“Rather, truth and substantive justice have
parallel influences on perceptions of legitimacy, with truth having a stronger direct influence.”).
FOR
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research that deserves further study. This Article, however, examines
perceptions of justice in COVID-19-era courts from a different perspective: the effects that these procedural changes may have on the
public’s view that the justice system treats people fairly.
Justice scholars are only beginning to examine the effects that these
differing methods for handling civil jury trials will have on participants
and the public with respect to their willingness to legitimize the courts.
If, as some commentators have suggested, some of these pandemicinduced procedural changes may become more permanent fixtures of
civil litigation into the future, empirical legitimacy research will be
critical.51 To the extent that the public believes that a court’s decisions
are legitimate exercises of power and authority, the public will be
more willing to comply with the court’s edicts.52 This can include
small-scale compliance, such as declining to be disruptive or uncooperative during the proceedings, but can also include larger-scale behaviors, such as a party’s willingness to pay civil judgments or
restitution orders, or a party’s (or a member of the public’s) unwillingness to resort to “self-help” outside the legal system.53
A bedrock principle in psychology states that participants care
about the quality of the process by which courts adjudicate cases—as
well as the interpersonal treatment to which parties and witnesses are
subjected as that process is implemented—as much and sometimes
more than they care about the substantive outcome of the dispute.54
That is, people are remarkably sensitive to procedural justice in addition to their perceptions of the substantive justice produced by the
courts.55 Indeed, recent research suggests that the public’s perceptions
of the procedural and interactional justice that a legal tribunal provides to litigants are the strongest predictors of the public’s willingness
to legitimize the tribunal and comply with its directives.56
51. See, e.g., Ryan Handlarski, Zoom Trials Are Here to Stay, and That Is a Good Thing,
CANADIAN LAWYER (Oct. 1, 2021), https://www.canadianlawyermag.com/news/opinion/zoom-trials-are-here-to-stay-and-that-is-a-good-thing/360383; see also Doug Austin, Are Virtual Court
Proceedings Here to Stay?, JD SUPRA (June 24, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/arevirtual-court-proceedings-here-to-3320909/.
52. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (2006) (discussing the conditions under which the public is likely to comply with legal directives and concluding that increased compliance is associated with increased perceptions of procedural justice and
institutional legitimacy).
53. See generally id.
54. See Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in the Federal
Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 132–38 (2011-2012).
55. Id.
56. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50, at 1129.

\\jciprod01\productn\D\DPL\71-2\DPL205.txt

502

unknown

Seq: 10

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

6-JUN-22

12:44

[Vol. 71:493

Researchers know far less about how pandemic-era procedural reforms will affect the public’s perceptions of the procedural justice afforded by the courts. Obtaining a deeper understanding of this issue
requires researchers to consider the ways in which pandemic-era trials
differ psychologically from trials during ordinary times. To the extent
that civil trials may now sometimes proceed over videoconferencing
software, litigants are physically removed from the courthouse. To the
extent that trials may proceed in person but with plexiglass barriers,
physical spacing, and masks, litigants might experience the trial as psychologically more distant as well. One psychological phenomenon that
may therefore provide insight into the ways that participants subjectively experience COVID-19-era civil trials is construal level theory.
This modern psychological theory reflects the idea of embodied cognition: that is, that aspects of our physical environment manifest themselves in our psychological experiences.57 More specifically, construal
level theory posits that the physical experience of distance can create
a corresponding psychological experience of distance across time and
space.58 To the extent that pandemic-era trials feel psychologically distant, the intersection of procedural justice and construal level theory
may provide important insights into the perceived legitimacy of the
civil justice system during the pandemic.
This Article is a call for additional research on the popular legitimacy of civil trial procedures in the COVID-19 era. To that end, it
provides a non-exhaustive overview of some of the psychological theories that may be useful. Part II discusses empirical models of institutional legitimacy more generally, and specifically examines the role of
decisional accuracy, distributive justice, and (perhaps most importantly) procedural justice in attaining popular legitimacy in service of
legal compliance.59 Part III examines the unexplored ways in which
perceptions of psychological distance and construal level theory might
illuminate our understanding of how the public perceives processes to
be fair.60 Part IV applies these principles to COVID-19-era procedural
innovations. It first provides a brief description of how the procedures
that govern civil trials have evolved over the course of the pandemic.
It then examines principles of procedural justice—with an eye toward
how those perceptions might be modified by perceptions of psychological distance—to determine the extent to which the public may be
57. Yaacov Trope & Nira Liberman, Construal-Level Theory of Psychological Distance, 117
PSYCHOL. REV. 440, 440 (2010).
58. Id. at 456.
59. See infra Part II.
60. See infra Part III.
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willing to legitimize the legal tribunals that employ these procedures
and comply with their directives.61 Part V concludes the Article.62
II.

THE LEGITIMIZING ROLE OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE
COURTS

Perceived legitimacy is understood as a condition precedent to compliance with legal authorities, attributable not to a fear of punishment,
but instead to perceptions that the decisionmaker has the right to exercise power.63 There is no shortage of legal scholarship on the perceived legitimacy of high-profile governmental actors, such as the U.S.
Supreme Court.64 There is far less research, however, examining the
perceived legitimacy of lower-level courts, which the public is far
more likely to encounter. This Part discusses the research to date on
the legitimacy of these lower-level courts and discusses a recent empirical model supporting the primacy of perceptions of procedural justice in increasing the popular legitimacy of these institutions.
A. Defining Legitimacy
Diverse theories of institutional legitimacy abound.65 Although they
differ with respect to several important tenets of the construct, and
with respect to its cognitive and behavioral prerequisites, these theories converge on the idea that legitimate institutions are those that the
public views as properly holding and exercising power.66 The term refers not just to the institutions themselves, but also to the actors within
those institutions and the orders and edicts that they produce.67
Sociologist Mark Suchman has argued that organizational legitimacy occurs when an institution enjoys public approval even when its
61. See infra Part IV
62. See infra Part V.
63. See generally TYLER, supra note 52.
64. See, e.g., Richard L. Pacelle, Jr., The Supreme Court’s Immense Power May Pose a Danger
to its Legitimacy, THE CONVERSATION (Sept. 28, 2021, 3:04 PM), https://theconversation.com/
the-supreme-courts-immense-power-may-pose-a-danger-to-its-legitimacy-168600; John F. Harris,
The Supreme Court is Begging For a Legitimacy Crisis, POLITICO (Oct. 29, 2020, 4:30 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/10/29/supreme-court-begging-for-legitimacy-crisis433573; Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240,
2240 (2019) (remarking that “it is striking how many commentators—including prominent constitutional scholars, a former Attorney General, and current members of Congress—have recently questioned the legitimacy of the United States Supreme Court”).
65. For a review of classic theories of legitimacy, see Morris Zelditch, Jr., Theories of Legitimacy, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEGITIMACY: EMERGING PERSPECTIVES ON IDEOLOGY, JUSTICE,
AND INTERGROUP RELATIONS 33, 33–53 (Jost & Major eds., 2001).
66. See Justin Sevier, Legitimizing Character Evidence, 68 EMORY L. J. 441, 456–57 (2019).
67. Id.
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actions deviate from individual interests.68 He further argues that institutional legitimacy contains three subcomponents: (1) pragmatic legitimacy, which focuses on the self-interest of those who evaluate the
institution; (2) moral legitimacy, which depends on the degree to
which the institution follows accepted behavioral norms and procedures; and (3) cognitive legitimacy, in which the entity is perceived as
necessary or inevitable to certain societal functions.69 If these components of legitimacy are satisfied, governed people confer status and
acceptance onto their governors’ institutions based on a belief that the
institutional actions constitute an appropriate use of power.70
Social psychologist Tom Tyler has added to this understanding by
operationalizing perceived legal legitimacy along four dimensions empirically: (1) the public’s perceived obligation to obey the courts; (2)
the public’s trust and confidence in the courts; (3) attitudes about
whether the courts themselves follow the law; and (4) the belief that
legal authorities have the same normative values as the public.71 It
follows that legal institutions that score highly along these dimensions
enjoy the greatest degree of popular legitimacy.
B. Components of Legal Legitimacy
Tyler further argues that, however it is operationalized, institutional
legitimacy with respect to the courts stems from three distinct but related functions: (1) the ability of courts to reach accurate decisions by
uncovering the facts underlying a dispute; (2) the ability to punish
fairly, both in terms of criminal sentencing and analogous civil damages awards and equitable relief; and (3) the extent to which the
courts have used fair processes—and have treated people fairly in implementing those processes—to resolve a dispute.72 These terms can
be described as decision accuracy, distributive justice, and procedural
justice, and they explain a substantial amount of the variance in the
public’s willingness to legitimize the courts.73 I describe each of them
briefly below, with an emphasis on procedural justice.
68. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approaches, 20
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995).
69. See id. at 577–85.
70. Id. at 574 (defining legitimacy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of
norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”).
71. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50, at 1117–18.
72. See generally id.
73. See generally id.
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1. Decision Accuracy and Distributive Justice
Very rarely will the public know with complete confidence exactly
what transpired in a dispute that comes to be adjudicated in court,
even in disputes in which “conclusive” video evidence is produced.
Trials are, by nature, reconstructive exercises that exemplify the concept of decision making under varying degrees of uncertainty.74 In this
context, decision accuracy refers to the perception among the public
that courts are skilled at uncovering the important facts underlying a
dispute, interpreting those facts correctly, and applying those facts to
the relevant law.75
Justice scholars have raised thoughtful questions regarding whether
decision accuracy is meaningfully distinct from the concept of distributive (substantive) justice.76 Substantive justice focuses on the perceived fairness of social outcomes—particularly in terms of societal
rewards, costs, and penalties.77 These perceptions are, in turn, affected
by the behavioral expectations and distributive norms of the social
group.78 To the extent that criminal and civil laws are enacted, they
are (in theory if not always in practice) a reflection of societal norms,
and a transgression against those norms is met with a response that
maintains social order.79 Thus, in the context of the courts, substantive
justice is concerned primarily with outcomes of legal disputes as they
relate to “punishments”: primarily, the appropriateness of sentencing
in criminal cases, but likely also the extent of compensatory or punitive damages awarded in civil trials.80
Initially, it may appear that decision accuracy and substantive justice are overlapping constructs, or that decision accuracy is a condition
precedent to perceptions of substantive justice. Yet, empirical research suggests that the concepts are distinct, and that one does not
always follow from the other. In a recent article reporting the results
from a national survey, Tyler found that decision accuracy items and
substantive justice items composed distinct factors that independently
explain the variance in perceptions of legitimacy.81 Moreover, in a recent study, I found that, with important caveats, the public tends to
74. See id. at 1100 (“It is unusual for fact finders to know the truth. Defendants deny guilt, and
witnesses and evidence are contradictory and confusing. Hence, truth is typically uncertain.”).
75. Id.
76. See Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50, at 1098–1100.
77. E.g., Morton Deutsch, Equity, Equality, and Need: What Determines Which Value Will Be
Used as the Basis of Distributive Justice?, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 137, 137–39 (1975).
78. Id.; see also Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50, at 1098–1100.
79. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50, at 1099.
80. Id. at 1098–1100 (discussing the role of punishment in establishing substantive justice).
81. Id. at 1125–26.
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associate the guilt or liability phase of a trial with efforts to attain
truth more so than substantive justice, whereas I found the opposite
with respect to the sentencing or damages phase of a trial: the public
perceived those phases as more concerned with fair outcomes than
with determining an “accurate” sentence or damage award.82 And as a
theoretical matter, Tyler has persuasively suggested that perceptions
of substantive justice need not be premised on perceptions of decision
accuracy, for example, in criminal convictions of “scapegoats who may
have at best a marginal relationship to the wrongdoing in question.”83
These findings suggest that decision accuracy and substantive justice
are separate constructs with independent effects on perceptions of institutional legitimacy.
2. Procedural Justice
Social science research on the public’s perceptions of the legitimacy
of the courts initially focused on the substantive outcomes that the
courts produce.84 Later research, however, suggested that the public’s
attitudes toward legal tribunals are more complex; they also depend
on the process by which those decisions are reached.85 This phenomenon, termed procedural justice, is distinct from procedural due process
or other non-empirical, normative procedural theories, and posits that
people’s perceptions of the justice afforded to them in a social transaction are shaped in part by their subjective evaluations of the fairness
of the procedures used to allocate resources.86 The phenomenon appears to be present in individuals as early as age five—either because
it is hard-wired or the result of early social learning87—and it exists in
an array of social contexts, including interactions with the police, with
arbitrators and mediators, and within the workplace.88
82. Justin Sevier, A [Relational] Theory of Procedure, 104 MINN. L. REV. 1987, 2031 (2020).
83. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50, at 1100.
84. For a review of distributive justice research, see generally John T. Jost & Aaron C. Kay,
Social Justice: History, Theory, and Research, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (Susan
T. Fiske et al. eds., 5th ed. 2010).
85. See generally JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS (1975) (introducing an early theoretical and empirical conception of procedural justice); Tom R. Tyler, What is Procedural Justice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess the
Fairness of Legal Procedures, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 103, 128 (1988).
86. E.g., Tom Tyler & David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land-Use Decisions: Criteria
for Evaluating Alternative Procedures, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 538, 541 (2010); Tom R.
Tyler et al., Influence of Voice on Satisfaction with Leaders: Exploring the Meaning of Process
Control, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 72, 72 (1985).
87. Patricia Grocke et al., Procedural Justice in Children: Preschoolers Accept Unequal Resource Distributions If the Procedure Provides Equal Opportunities, 140 J. EXPERIMENTAL
CHILD PSYCHOL. 197, 197–98, 200, 209 (2015).
88. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 54, at 133.
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In the legal context, researchers have provided several reasons for
why litigants are sensitive to the procedures that legal institutions use
to resolve disputes, but the prevailing explanation links procedures to
one’s social identity.89 Specifically, the perceived fairness or unfairness of a legal procedure sends implicit, relational signals to litigants
that have downstream effects on self-esteem and appraisals of selfworth, which are strongly and positively correlated.90
An influential theory for explaining the effects of the decision-making process on an institution’s perceived legitimacy lies in Tyler’s
group value model.91 The group value model predicts that four factors
will influence people’s perceptions of their self-identity as a result of
their interaction with a legal tribunal.92 Two of these factors relate to
judgments about the fairness of the procedures themselves: the degree
to which participants feel as if they have been heard during the proceedings and the presence of a neutral forum.93 The remaining factors
relate not to the procedures directly but instead to the quality of the
interpersonal treatment that litigants receive as they submit to those
procedures: the degree to which the judge appears trustworthy and
the degree of dignity and respect that the judge affords the parties.94
C. Empirical Legitimacy Model: The Outsized Role of Procedural
Justice
Although decision accuracy, distributive justice, and procedural justice each have been linked to perceptions of institutional legitimacy,95
researchers have only just begun examining the relative weight that
the public gives these constructs, and until recently, no one had proposed a comprehensive model for understanding the relationship
among them. Prior research, however, has suggested that procedural
justice may play an outsized role among the three constructs.96 For
example, studies have suggested that people are more willing to accept an unfavorable legal ruling if they are given a chance to speak
directly to the tribunal, even when they are told explicitly that the
tribunal will not consider what they say in making its ultimate deci89. See Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the Group-Value Model,
57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830, 830–32 (1989).
90. See id.
91. Id. at 830–31.
92. Id. at 830–32.
93. Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50, at 1107.
94. Tom R. Tyler & E. Allen Lind, A Relational Model of Authority in Groups, 25 ADVANCES
IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 115, 142 (1992).
95. See generally Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50 (discussing these concepts in detail).
96. Id. at 1100.
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sion.97 Apparently the mere act of allowing participants to speak increases their perceptions of procedural justice, which directly impacts
their willingness to legitimize the institution.
Against this background, in 2014, Tyler and I conducted a representative, national survey examining the relationship between the public’s
attitudes regarding the extent to which courts establish truth, the frequency with which judicial decisions reflect substantive justice, the
fairness of the procedures that resolve the disputes, and participants’
attitudes toward the legitimacy of the courts.98 The results are summarized in the path analysis illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Empirical Model of the Legitimacy of the Courts99

Consistent with the psychological literature, the empirical model reflects a strong association between perceptions of legitimacy and the
public’s willingness to comply with legal rules. It also demonstrates
that decision accuracy, substantive justice, and procedural justice each
have an important role to play in fostering the public’s perceptions of
the courts as legitimate. Perhaps counterintuitively, decision accuracy
appears to exercise its influence on popular legitimacy independent of
the role of substantive justice, providing additional support for the
proposition that these are conceptually distinct constructs that are not
inextricably linked to one another.
But the most important finding in our study involves the role of
procedural justice in fostering perceptions of legitimacy in the courts.
97. Tyler & Lind, supra note 94, at 149.
98. See generally Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50. We invited 2,561 respondents—randomly chosen from a larger ongoing panel of U.S. residents maintained by Knowledge Networks—to participate in our study. We received responses from 1,603 participants, for a response rate of
62.5%. Id at 1118.
99. A version of this model originally appeared in Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50, at 1137. This
path analysis treats the two dimensions of procedural justice—the fairness of the procedure itself
and the fairness of the manner in which it is implemented interpersonally—as separate
constructs. All coefficients are standardized and significant at p < .05. Paths not constructed in
the model were non-significant (all ps > .05).
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Our regression analysis indicates that the primary judgment shaping
the popular legitimacy of the courts is the procedural justice of the
tribunals’ actions.100 This is the case whether we treated procedural
justice as one construct or if we broke it down into its constituent
dimensions: fair procedures and fair treatment.101 Decision accuracy
and substantive punishment also exhibited effects on legitimacy, but
these effects were far weaker when each was included in the comprehensive model.102 Moreover, procedural justice exhibited its effects in
two ways: (1) through a strong, direct effect on legitimacy perceptions;
and (2) through indirect pathways, in which the dimension of fair procedures influenced perceptions of substantive justice, which exerted
its influence on legitimacy perceptions; and in which the dimension of
fair treatment influenced perceptions of decision accuracy, which exerted its effects on legitimacy.103
This model ultimately suggests that because the relational signals
inherent in the process through which a legal decision is reached are
so important to an individual’s social identity, the tribunal’s decisionmaking process is often stronger than the case outcome itself in determining the degree to which the public confers legitimacy onto the
courts.104 To the extent that these relational signals are communicated
by the procedure, people are significantly more willing to confer legitimacy onto the decision-making body, are more willing to respect that
body and abide by its decisions, and have more confidence in that
body to make decisions that are distributively and procedurally just.105
III.

THE UNEXPLORED ROLE

OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL DISTANCE

Analyzing the extent to which litigants and the public believe that
pandemic-era civil jury trials are procedurally just, and therefore legitimate, requires more than simply analyzing the four facets of procedural justice. It also requires researchers to examine the meaningful
ways in which pandemic-era jury trials differ from how trials proceed
during ordinary times. One dimension in which pandemic-era trials
deviate from traditional jury trials is the degree of distance experienced by litigants. In trials by Zoom, participants are separated from
100. Id. at 1125.
101. Id. at 1125–26, 1132.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 54, at 137 (noting that “[t]he findings from over three
decades of research on the psychology of procedural justice research stand in sharp contrast to
the continuing insistence of law and economics scholars that individuals are most interested, in
any given setting, in maximizing their economic outcomes”).
105. See generally Tyler & Sevier, supra note 50.
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the courthouse and other participants by physical distance. Participants in “sanitized,” in-person trials also experience some degree of
physical distance, but the presence of several COVID-19 mitigation
protocols may create an additional layer psychologically. Researchers
have examined the concept of psychological distance in several nonlegal contexts.106 This section explains this concept and examines how
it may impact judgments of procedural justice.
A. Construal Level Theory Defined
When people think about distance, they most commonly think of
physical separation along a spatial plane.107 This universal understanding of physical distance serves as a bridge toward more abstract notions of “distance” because humans tend to analogize higher-order
psychological and philosophical concepts to phenomena in the physical world.108 This process is a form of embodied cognition, in which
physical cues from one’s environment manifest themselves in one’s
internal states and thoughts.109 For example, in a classic study on embodied cognition, psychology professor John Bargh and colleagues
found that research participants who briefly held hot coffee while riding in an elevator with a third party behaved more “warm[ly]” toward
the third party than did participants who instead held iced coffee.110
The concept of “psychological distance” is a primary component of
construal level theory, which states that individuals ascribe different
social meaning to psychologically close and distant objects in their environment.111 Psychological distance is a broad phenomenon that represents four distinct dimensions, including spatial distance (physical
space), temporal distance (time), social distance (interpersonal relations), and hypothetical distance (imagining whether certain events
are likely or unlikely).112 Construal level theorists contend that thinking about the past or future, a remote location, someone else’s perspective in a social situation, or counterfactual alternatives to a social
106. See, e.g., Lawrence E. Williams & John A. Bargh, Keeping One’s Distance: The Influence
of Spatial Distance Cues on Affect and Evaluation, 19 PSYCHOL. SCI. 302, 302–03 (2008).
107. Id. at 302–03.
108. Id.
109. Emily Balcetis & David Dunning, Cognitive Dissonance and the Perception of Natural
Environments, 18 PSYCHOL. SCI. 917, 921 (2007).
110. Lawrence E. Williams & John A. Bargh, Experiencing Physical Warmth Promotes Interpersonal Warmth, 322 SCI. 606, 607 (2008).
111. See Trope & Liberman, supra note 57, at 442; see generally W. Beckerman, Distance and
the Pattern of Inter-European Trade, 38 REV. ECON. & STATS. 31 (1956).
112. Trope & Liberman, supra note 57, at 440–41, 445–48.
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situation are all different forms of the same underlying embodied cognitive process.113
Psychological distance is relevant to decision making and impression formation because people process information in systematically
different ways depending on how they perceive the social space between themselves and some target in their environment.114 Specifically, construal level theory predicts that humans form high-level,
abstract representations of psychologically distal objects and form
low-level, concrete representations (called exemplars) of psychologically proximal objects.115 For example, depending on the context in
which it is relevant, a cellular telephone can be represented concretely
as a “cell phone” (a low-level construal) or more abstractly as a “communication device” (a high-level construal), and similarly, a soda can
be represented as a “Diet Coke” (a low-level construal) or a “drink”
(a high-level construal).116 Therefore, where psychological distance is
heightened, environmental targets are processed in a manner that preserves the target’s essential properties at the expense of unimportant
details,117 and vice versa where psychological distance between the
person and the target is minimized.118
B. Psychological Distance and Procedural Justice
Perceptions of procedural justice are ultimately judgments about
social relationships. And the psychological distance between an observer and the object of the observer’s attention is often rife with social meaning. For example, choosing a seat farther away from another
person, or waiting a significant amount of time to return that person’s
telephone call, are perceived by others as reflecting social distance.119
As discussed in more detail below, researchers have only recently begun to explore the relationship between perceptions of psychological
distance and procedural justice, but the small body of research to date
suggests that the psychological proximity or distality of a legal tribunal
to both its participants and to the public systematically affects their
procedural justice judgments, which in turn affects their perceptions
113. Id. at 440–41, 443.
114. Id. at 440.
115. Id. at 441.
116. Id. at 441, 449.
117. Id. at 441–42, 448 (noting that “[b]ecause abstract representations necessarily impose one
of many alternative interpretations, and because irrelevant or inconsistent details are omitted or
assimilated to it, these representations tend to be simpler, less ambiguous, more coherent, more
schematic, and more prototypical than concrete representations”).
118. Id. at 448.
119. Id. at 445.
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of the court’s legitimacy and their willingness to comply with its
directives.120
The clearest finding from this body of research is that increasing the
psychological space between an actor and an environmental target decreases the “bond strength” between them—particularly as it relates
to feelings of familiarity, similarity, and cohesiveness—while it simultaneously decreases the degree to which the actor places trust and
confidence in the target.121 Researchers have demonstrated these distance effects on bonding and trust in a variety of psychological contexts. In early studies in the workplace, researchers found that the
extent to which employee workspaces are more diffuse—for example,
spread out within a floor or spread between floors—workers experience lowered perceptions of bonding and trust.122 In older research
that may not be replicated in today’s changing, more inclusive workplaces, researchers also found that the increased heterogeneity of the
workplace in terms of demographics and societal attitudes—which
they described as experiential and social distance—may also produce
these effects.123
Similar effects have been exhibited with respect to consumer behavior. Several studies strongly suggest that psychological distance limits
perceptions of retailer trustworthiness and benevolence in the online
context.124 Further, in a series of studies, marketing professor YuanShuh Lii and colleagues examined the effects of psychological distance
between service providers and consumers in the event of a service failure.125 Lii and colleagues found that consumers who interacted with
the service provider in-person rather than in an online context (whom
they hypothesized would be both physically and socially more distant
from the service provider), reported greater satisfaction with the pro-

120. See infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
121. Jason A. Colquitt et al., Justice in Teams: Antecedents and Consequences of Procedural
Justice Climate, 55 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 83, 103 (2002); Yuan-Shuh Lii et al., Balancing the
Scales: Recovering from Service Failures Depends on the Psychological Distance of Consumers,
32 SERV. INDUSTRIES J. 1775, 1775–78 (2012).
122. Elisabeth Norman et al., The Distance between Us: Using Construal Level Theory to Understand Interpersonal Distance in a Digital Age, 3 FRONTIERS DIGITAL HUMAN. 1, 2–3 (2016).
123. For a review, see Colquitt et al., supra note 121, at 93–94, 103–04.
124. Steven M. Edwards et al., Does Place Matter When Shopping Online? Perceptions of
Similarity and Familiarity as Indicators of Psychological Distance, 10 J. INTERACTIVE ADVERT.
35, 46 (2009).
125. See generally Yuan-Shuh Lii et al., The Challenges of Long-Distance Relationships: The
Effects of Psychological Distance Between Service Provider and Consumer on the Efforts to Recover from Service Failure, 43 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1121 (2013).
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vider along with greater feelings of distributive, procedural, and interactional justice with respect to the process.126
Although the body of research examining the effects of psychological distance on perceptions of fairness is small, it has clear implications for procedural justice scholars and researchers interested in the
legitimacy of legal institutions. Perceptions of a target actor’s trustworthiness are a crucial component of the interactional facet of procedural justice, whereas the degree to which people are willing to place
their trust in that actor is a critical component of popular legitimacy.127 The context in which these findings emerged are, of course,
quite different from legal proceedings, where the public interacts with
those who hold direct power over them instead of coworkers or businesses. But the pathway is one that deserves exploration, insofar as
these principles may be generalizable to legal contexts. To this end,
Figure 2 provides an updated but simplified model of how psychological distance might shape popular perceptions of legal legitimacy.128
Figure 2. Theorized Effects of Psychological Distance on Legal
Legitimacy

IV.

THE LEGITIMACY

OF

CIVIL DISPUTES

IN

THE COVID-19 ERA

This Part explains some of the most common and controversial procedural innovations in state and federal civil jury trials that have resulted from the COVID-19 pandemic. It then explores, with an eye
toward the moderating effects of psychological distance, the degree to
which these innovations might increase or decrease public perceptions
of the procedural justice afforded by the civil courts as well as the
126. Id. at 1121, 1124, 1128.
127. See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.
128. The path model is a simplified conceptual representation that treats procedural justice
and legitimacy holistically (instead of breaking them into their components). It also focuses on
the effects of legal procedures on perceptions of procedural justice, independent of any effects
that they may have on decision accuracy or substantive justice.
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downstream effects those perceptions may have on the public’s willingness to legitimize these tribunals.
A. Civil Jury Trials in a Pre-COVID-19 Era (and the Arrival of
COVID-19)
Traditionally, the American civil justice system has enjoyed a substantial degree of popular legitimacy, measured both in public opinion
surveys and in controlled experiments.129 This is attributable substantially to the public’s view that American trials place a premium on
processes that enhance perceptions of procedural justice.130 Specifically, American civil disputes are resolved through the adversary system, which allows participants to present dueling evidence and
arguments to a neutral factfinder, and which the public consistently
rates highly with respect to the degree of participant “voice” in the
proceedings, the presence of a neutral and trustworthy factfinder, and
the presence of respectful interpersonal treatment, which are critical
components of procedural justice.131
This heightened legitimacy is conferred not only by litigants but also
by members of the general public, many of whom have never engaged
directly with the courts.132 There are several theories for why this is
true, but it is likely attributable, in part, to the fact that American
legal proceedings are generally open to the public, increasing the public’s perceptions of the courts’ transparency, trustworthiness, and neutrality.133 In criminal cases, this facet of American judicial decision
making is enshrined in the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
(incorporated against the States in the Fourteenth Amendment) and is
129. See Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Popular Legitimacy and the Exercise of Legal
Authority: Motivating Compliance, Cooperation, and Engagement, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, &
L. 78, 89 (2014) (“The results of our in-depth look at legitimacy support the general finding of
most superficial public opinion polls which indicate that American legal authorities enjoy moderately favorable popular legitimacy.”).
130. Id.
131. Indeed, dispute resolution systems that decrease the ability of participants to present
their own arguments and evidence and instead centralize that power within the factfinder tend to
rate higher with respect to their ability to correctly find the facts but lower with respect to the
procedural justice that they afford litigants. See Justin Sevier, The Truth-Justice Tradeoff: Perceptions of Decisional Accuracy and Procedural Justice in Adversarial and Inquisitorial Legal Systems, 20 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 212, 213, 219 (2014).
132. See Tyler & Jackson, supra note 129, at 82, 84 (reporting the results of a national study
that they conducted with a representative sample of 1,603 participants, only some of whom reported direct experience with legal authorities).
133. See, e.g., Metlife, Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 663 (D.C. Cir.
2017) (“The right of public access is a fundamental element to the rule of law, important to
maintaining the integrity and legitimacy of an independent Judicial Branch.”); see generally Tyler
& Jackson, supra note 129 (examining this issue empirically).
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suggested by the First Amendment, which courts have interpreted to
provide a qualified right of public access to legal proceedings.134
This Sixth Amendment protection, of course, does not apply to federal civil cases, but the void has been filled by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Rule 77(b) states that “[e]very trial on the merits
must be conducted in open court and, so far as convenient, in a regular courtroom.”135 And with respect to witness testimony, Rule 43(a)
similarly states that “[a]t trial, the witnesses’ testimony must be taken
in open court,” although it provides flexibility by also recognizing that
“in compelling circumstances and with appropriate safeguards, the
court may permit testimony in open court by contemporaneous transmission from a different location.”136
In late 2019, however, public health experts discovered a novel and
highly contagious coronavirus, named SARS-CoV-2.137 The virus
spread quickly across the globe and reached pandemic status in March
of 2020.138 At the time of this writing, it has sickened roughly 360
million people worldwide, leading to approximately 5.62 million
deaths.139 Of those cases and deaths, the virus has infected roughly 73
million people in the United States, of which nearly 874,000 Americans have died.140 Because of the highly contagious nature of the virus
and the seriousness of the symptoms in many infected individuals,
many state and local governments mandated business and government
closures, prohibited large gatherings by individuals, or issued maskwearing mandates in an effort to contain the virus and mitigate its
spread.141 Against this backdrop, trial court administrators faced diffi134. See U.S. CONST. amends. I, VI.
135. FED. R. CIV. P. 77(b).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 43(a).
137. See, e.g., Scott LaFee, Novel Coronavirus Circulated Undetected Months before First
COVID-19 Cases in Wuhan, China, UC SAN DIEGO HEALTH (Mar. 18, 2021), https://
health.ucsd.edu/news/releases/Pages/2021-03-18-novel-coronavirus-circulated-undetectedmonths-before-first-covid-19-cases-in-wuhan-china.aspx (noting that “[c]ases of COVID-19 were
first reported in late-December 2019 in Wuhan” and reporting that the virus may have emerged
in October 2019). SARS-CoV-2 causes the acute respiratory disease named COVID-19. See Ben
Hu et al., Characteristics of SARS-CoV-2 and COVID-19, 19 NATURE REVS. MICROBIOLOGY
141, 141 (2021), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41579-020-00459-7.
138. See Celebrating the One Billion Vaccine Milestone, WHO, https://www.who.int/india/
emergencies/coronavirus-disease-(covid-19)#:~:text=ON%2011%20March%202020%2C,to
%20save%20people’s%20lives (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (“On 11 March 2020, WHO declared
Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) outbreak as a pandemic . . . .”).
139. See WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard, WHO, https://covid19.who.int/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2022).
140. . COVID Data Tracker, CDC, https://covid.cdc.gov/covid-data-tracker/#datatrackerhome (last visited Jan. 27, 2022).
141. See Local Government Responses to the Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic, 2020, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Local_government_responses_to_the_coronavirus_(COVID-
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cult decisions regarding how trials would be held—if they were to be
held at all—in an era of COVID-19.
B. Civil Jury Trials in the COVID-19 Era
In March of 2020, the National Center for State Courts, in collaboration with the Conference of Chief Justices and Conference of State
Court Administrators, created a “Rapid Response Team,” which was
tasked with creating “a roadmap to help state courts move forward
during the pandemic—and after it ends . . . [to identify] and develop[ ]
innovations and new practices that will strengthen courts moving forward.”142 The Rapid Response Team’s website contains comprehensive links to various state court COVID-19 websites, virtual hearing
resources, updates on statewide jury trial restrictions, and representative state court emergency orders.143 The resources tell largely the
same story. The state courts’ initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic was largely the same as their response to the 1918 Spanish Flu
Pandemic a century ago: to suspend jury trials until the pandemic
poses less of a threat to public health.144 And it was roughly the same
story in the federal courts. The official website for the U.S. Courts
contains a database of orders by jurisdiction both at the appellate
court and district court level, and those orders indicate that the initial
response from most federal courts was to hold jury trials in
abeyance.145
With respect to criminal trials, however, important constitutional
concerns militate against suspending jury trials in perpetuity. For nonpetty offenses, the U.S. Constitution’s Sixth Amendment requires that
19)_pandemic,_2020 (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (listing local government responses by geographic
area).
142. See Coronavirus and the Courts, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, https://www.ncsc.org/
newsroom/public-health-emergency (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
143. Id.
144. See id. (hosting individual state court orders responding to the pandemic); William Raftery, Preparing Courts for a Pandemic, 104 JUDICATURE 2, 2 (2020), https://judicature.duke.edu/
articles/preparing-courts-for-a-pandemic/ (noting that the 1918 Spanish flu “forced state courts
to close for weeks on end”); Stephen Pate, Law in a Time of Pandemic: How Texas Courts and
Lawyers Responded to the Pandemic of 1918-1920, TEX. BAR BLOG (Apr. 20, 2020), https://
blog.texasbar.com/2020/04/articles/coronavirus/law-in-a-time-of-pandemic-how-texas-courts-and
-lawyers-responded-to-the-pandemic-of-1918-1920/ (discussing Texas courts’ responses to the
1918 Spanish flu pandemic in detail).
145. See generally Court Orders and Updates during COVID-19 Pandemic, U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/court-website-links/court-orders-and-updatesduring-covid19-pandemic (last visited Jan. 17, 2022) (listing and providing links to individual
court orders by jurisdiction). For one example, see, e.g., In Re: Court Operations Under the
Exigent Circumstances Created by COVID-19 and Related Coronavirus (General Order 391002, Mar. 17, 2020) (continuing all civil and criminal jury trials for an initial thirty-day period).
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“the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury.”146 This right has been incorporated to the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and many
states impose by statute the maximum number of days for which a
criminal defendant can be held without a trial.147 Moreover, other sections of the Sixth Amendment, including the Confrontation Clause,
provide the accused the right to confront her accusers in open court,
further complicating decisions to suspend jury trials indefinitely.148
But perhaps equally important—particularly with respect to civil
trials that are not subject to constitutional mandates regarding the
time and manner in which they operate—is the practical reality that
courts maintain heavy docket backlogs when disputes are not resolved. For example, at the time of this writing, in one California federal district where civil disputes typically outnumber criminal cases,
there are approximately 1,138 criminal cases pending but 15,514 civil
cases awaiting trial, and the figures in some state courts are even more
staggering.149 These practical concerns with respect to citizens’ access
to justice, along with constitutional concerns in criminal cases, likely
acted in tandem to incentivize courts to begin scheduling trials for adjudication. The looming question was the extent to which these trials
would resemble “normal” trials and, if they deviated materially, the
extent to which the public would be willing to legitimize them.
1. COVID-19-Era Innovations
Perhaps the biggest change during the COVID-19 era, as it relates
to jury trial scheduling, is that most disputes on the docket are criminal matters, which many courts have prioritized in response to statutory and constitutional concerns.150 But at least some jurisdictions
146. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). At least one federal judge in California has
dismissed charges on these grounds. His verdict was overturned on appeal by the Ninth Circuit.
See Maura Dolan, U.S. Court Upholds COVID-19 Delays in Criminal Trials, Citing Half a Million Lives Lost, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2021, 7:48 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/
2021-04-23/appeals-court-upholds-pandemic-delays-criminal-trials.
147. Federal courts use a four-factor balancing test rather than a bright line rule. See Barker v.
Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972) (holding that in assessing violations of the Sixth Amendment
right to a speedy trial, courts should assess (1) whether the defendant protested during the delay;
(2) the length of the delay; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) the prejudice of the delay to the
defendant’s ability to receive a fair trial).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
149. Michael Finnegan & Maura Dolan, Coronavirus Shutdown of Jury Trials Upends California’s Federal Courts, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/202104-12/coronavirus-federal-court-jury-trials-shutdown-california.
150. See, e.g., Superior Court of the State of California for the County of Los Angeles, Administrative Order of the Presiding Judge Re COVID-19 Pandemic (Sept. 10, 2020) (“[T]he
Court finds good cause to continue any and all civil jury trials until January 2021. In addition,
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have also begun scheduling civil trials for adjudication.151 Court administrators have taken different approaches with respect to the procedural features that these civil trials possess, but they largely fall
within two camps: (1) in-person jury trials that adhere to various Centers for Disease Control and Prevention-suggested precautions to mitigate the spread of COVID-19; or, less often, (2) virtual trials that
capitalize on group videoconferencing technology that allow disputes
to be resolved without the participants coming into physical contact
with one another. Each path has significant benefits and drawbacks.
a. In-Person Jury Trials
As of January 2022, nearly all federal and state courts have either
reopened to some degree or plan to reopen soon.152 There was, perhaps by necessity, a patchwork quality to these reopenings; some
states never officially closed their courthouse doors, others have reopened their doors to all proceedings, others have left the decision to
the discretion of local administrators, others are prioritizing only criminal trials, and still others require courthouses that wish to reopen to
submit a detailed plan for state-level approval with respect to the
measures that those courthouses will take to mitigate the spread of
COVID-19.153
pursuant to Penal Code section 1050, the Court will prioritize available jurors and jury trials to
criminal cases.”); see also Ronald D. White, What Happens When COVID Shuts Civil Courts?,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2020, 3:03 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-09-11/covidshuts-courts-mediation-arbitration-boom (discussing the effects of prioritizing criminal cases on
civil litigants); Tully, supra note 10 (stating that, compared to civil cases, criminal cases “are
governed by speedy trial rules that require timely action, particularly when a defendant is imprisoned”); Finnegan & Dolan, supra note 149 (noting that trials generally must start within seventy
days after criminal defendants invoke their speedy trial rights, and that “criminal trials will have
top priority . . . starting with defendants in custody,” in the view of one federal district court
judge).
151. See, e.g., Haley Lerner, Jury Selection via Zoom: First Miami-Dade Case is a Glimpse of
Court in the Coronavirus Era, MIAMI HERALD (July 15, 2020), https://www.miamiherald.com/
news/coronavirus/article244218482.html (discussing the state’s first in-person, socially distanced
civil trial since pandemic-mandated closures); see also Presiding Judge Eric C. Taylor Announces
New Civil Jury Trial Ramp-Up Plan to Preserve Jurors, Promote Social Distancing, SUPERIOR
COURT OF CAL., CTY. OF L.A. (Apr. 1, 2021), https://www.lacourt.org/newsmedia/uploads/1420
214113325121NTACivilJuryTrials.pdf (discussing the early stages of plans to reinstate in-person
civil jury trials).
152. For an up-to-date, state-by-state breakdown of COVID-19 protocols, see generally Court
Operations During COVID-19: 50-State Resources, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/covid-19/50state-covid-19-resources/court-operations-during-covid-19-50-state-resources/ (last visited Jan.
18, 2022). For federal courts, see generally COVID-19 JUDICIAL TASK FORCE, CONDUCTING
JURY TRIALS AND CONVENING GRAND JURIES DURING THE PANDEMIC (2020), https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/combined_jury_trial_post_covid_doc_6.10.20.pdf.
153. See generally Court Operations During COVID-19: 50-State Resources, supra note 152;
COVID-19 JUDICIAL TASK FORCE, supra note 152.
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In courthouses that have reopened their doors, “[j]ustice in a pandemic environment will have a very different look and feel,” according to an August 2020 press release issued on the United States
Federal Courts website.154 That statement appears prescient. There is
also a patchwork quality—tailored to local conditions—to the extent
to which individual courthouses have prepared for in-person trials and
the methods they are using to stop the spread of the virus.
The most common innovations involve sanitizing the courtrooms,
requiring that in-person participants wear masks, and creating physical distance between in-person participants.155 The implementation of
masking rules, however, has been met with controversy; news reports
indicate that courts have differed, in response to objections from
counsel, regarding the appropriateness of having witnesses testify
without a mask.156
Most courts have implemented some form of social distancing policy, although the execution varies substantially by jurisdiction. Jurisdictions that can afford to do so have installed plexiglass barriers
around areas where participants speak—for example, in front of the
judge, the witness box, and counsel’s lectern—and between participants who cannot maintain sufficient distance from one another.157
These courts place plexiglass barriers between clients and counsel at
the defense table and the plaintiff’s (or prosecutor’s) table, as well as
between jurors, if they are required to sit in the jury box.158 Other
154. As Courts Restore Operations, COVID-19 Creates a New Normal, U.S. COURTS (Aug. 20,
2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/08/20/courts-restore-operations-covid-19-createsnew-normal.
155. Id.; see also Katie Mettler, Sanitizer, Face Shields and a Plexiglass Maze: What Jury Trials
Look Like in a Pandemic, WASH. POST (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
legal-issues/sanitizer-face-shields-and-a-plexiglass-maze-what-jury-trials-look-like-in-a-pandemic/2020/09/18/0ed75970-f8fc-11ea-89e3-4b9efa36dc64_story.html (“The attorneys were their
own cleanup crews, responsible for sanitizing everything they touched.”).
156. See, e.g., Matt Hamilton, Workers in L.A.’s Courts Are Dying of COVID-19 as In-Person
Hearings, Trials Continue, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2021), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/
2021-02-05/covid-complicates-in-person-trials-la-courthouses [hereinafter Hamilton, Workers in
L.A.’s Courts] (reporting on an incident in which a California Superior Court judge, responding
to a defense attorney’s objection, allowed a police officer to testify without a mask, to the consternation of one of the interpreters in the courtroom; the interpreter lodged a complaint against
the judge). Some courts have moved witnesses to another room to testify remotely without their
masks, in an effort to balance the jury’s need to gauge the credibility of witnesses, as well as the
criminal defendant’s right to confront witnesses, against the threat posed to public health by
allowing witnesses to testify mask-less. Other courts have allowed witnesses to testify with face
shields so that witnesses may stay in the room. Id.; see also Nicole Hong & Jan Ransom, Only 9
Trials in 9 Months: Virus Wreaks Havoc on N.Y.C. Courts, N. Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2020) (reporting
on, among other trials, a state court drug trial in which “a police officer testified while wearing a
see-through mask and face shield”).
157. See Mettler, supra note 155.
158. Id.
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courts have removed the gallery from the courthouse and have moved
jurors into socially-distanced seats (or have instead moved jurors into
pre-assigned seats in the gallery).159 Because courts vary with respect
to their size, smaller courts have been compelled to do what some
courts did during the Spanish Flu Pandemic of 1918 and have moved
proceedings to an outside venue, or to a larger venue in the area, including high school gymnasiums and ballrooms.160
Although implemented less frequently, other courts have required
digital temperature checks upon entry, have allowed attorneys to wear
headsets to communicate with clients,161 have nearby prepaid parking
lots to discourage participants and court personnel from using public
transportation, and have modified the court’s air circulation system
for increased filtration.162 Photographs of some of these innovations
appear in Figure 3.163
Figure 3. Photographs of COVID-19-Era Precautions for In-Person
Proceedings

159. Id.
160. Ann E. Marimow & Justin Jouvenal, Courts Dramatically Rethink the Jury Trial in the
Era of the Coronavirus, WASH. POST (July 31, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/legal-issues/jury-trials-coronavirus/2020/07/31/8c1fd784-c604-11ea-8ffe-372be8d82298_story.html.
161. See As Courts Restore Operations, COVID-19 Creates a New Normal, supra note 154.
162. Id.
163. Mettler, supra note 155 (top left image); As Courts Restore Operations, COVID-19 Creates a New Normal, supra note 154 (top middle image); Marimow & Jouvenal, supra note 160
(top right image); Mettler, supra note 155 (bottom left image); Rebecca Rosenberg, A Peak
Inside NYC’s First Socially Distanced Jury Trial Since COVID-19 Shutdown, N.Y. POST (Oct. 29,
2020, 5:04 PM), https://nypost.com/2020/10/29/a-peak-inside-the-citys-first-jury-trial-since-covid19-shutdown/; As Courts Restore Operations, COVID-19 Creates a New Normal, supra note 154
(bottom right image).
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b. Virtual Civil Trials
In many courts, the decision to prioritize criminal jury trials has left
civil plaintiffs and defendants in legal limbo as understaffed courts begin to sift through their backlogs.164 A few states—upon the agreement of the parties and sometimes in conjunction with a judge’s
finding—have allowed for bench trials to resume over group videoconferencing software such as Zoom, a virtual communication staple
during the pandemic.165 An even smaller number of states, and a
handful of federal district courts, have gone further by allowing civil
jury trials to be held over Zoom, either as a nonbinding proceeding
designed to facilitate settlement or as a binding trial.166
Whether a full virtual civil trial—in which the judge, the parties,
their attorneys, the bailiff, the court reporter, the witnesses, and the
jurors would all be present on Zoom—would survive constitutional
scrutiny is an open question,167 in contrast to virtual criminal trials,
where commentators appear dubious of their constitutionality.168 One
federal judge noted to reporters that the librarians for the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined the issue, and chiefly because the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause does not apply to
civil cases, she felt comfortable proceeding with virtual civil trials.169
Against that background, the Judicial Conference, which serves as the
national policymaking body for the federal courts, issued guidance
providing for media and public teleconference access to federal civil
court proceedings.170
164. White, supra note 150.
165. See As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean into Virtual Technology, U.S. COURTS (Feb. 18,
2021), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2021/02/18/pandemic-lingers-courts-lean-virtual-tech
nology#:~:text=A%20screenshot%20shows%20a%20recent,conducted%20by%20Judge
%20Mary%20S.&text=since%20the%20pandemic%20first%20closed,the%20use%20
of%20electronic%20communications.
166. See, e.g., Nate Raymond, Texas Tries a Pandemic First: A Jury Trial by Zoom, REUTERS
(May 18, 2020, 6:19 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-courts-texas/
texas-tries-a-pandemic-first-a-jury-trial-by-zoom-idUSKBN22U1FE.
167. See As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean into Virtual Technology, supra note 165 (recounting an interview with a federal judge who noted that there was “literally . . . no precedent in the
federal Judiciary” on the issue of virtual trials and “only . . . a few futuristic articles by legal
scholars”).
168. See, e.g., Phillip C. Hamilton, The Practical and Constitutional Issues with Virtual Trials in
Criminal Cases, ABA (Feb. 26, 2021), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/criminal/articles/2021/spring2021-practical-and-constitutional-issues-with-virtual-jury-trialsin-criminal-cases/ [hereinafter Hamilton, The Practical and Constitutional Issues].
169. As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean into Virtual Technology, supra note 165.
170. Judiciary Authorizes Video/Audio Access During COVID-19 Pandemic, U.S. COURTS
(Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/03/31/judiciary-authorizes-videoaudio-access-during-covid-19-pandemic.
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It is unclear exactly how many civil jury trials have been conducted
virtually, although it appears that they have been conducted in federal
courts in the Western District of Washington and the Middle District
of Florida, along with a non-binding trial that was conducted in state
court in Austin, Texas.171 Outcomes from these proceedings include
two verdicts for plaintiffs in amounts of $1 million, a verdict for the
defendant, and a settlement in another case after the eighth day of
virtual trial.172 Figure 4 shows the publicly available videoconference
feed from two of those trials.173
Figure 4. Screenshots of Virtual Civil Proceedings in State and
Federal Court

Jurors in these proceedings have not spoken on the record about
their experience, but an attorney for the losing party in a civil trial in
the Middle District of Florida suggested that he was not favorably inclined toward the medium.174 Nonetheless, three federal judges who
spoke to reporters about their experiences with virtual jury trials
spoke positively.175 Although they noted some technical glitches—for
example, a windstorm temporarily knocked out one juror’s internet
connection—the judges equated those glitches to routine delays that
occur in in-person proceedings.176 And they praised several aspects of
the virtual trial, including the ability of the jury to see witnesses’ faces
more clearly on Zoom than they would in the courtroom, as well as
jurors’ ability to see and read exhibits more clearly.177 Judge Mary
Scriven further stated that the jurors to whom she spoke after the con171. See As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean into Virtual Technology, supra note 165; Raymond, supra note 166.
172. As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean into Virtual Technology, supra note 165.
173. Marimow & Jouvenal, supra note 160 (left image); As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean
into Virtual Technology, supra note 165 (right image).
174. Lean, supra note 18.
175. As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean into Virtual Technology, supra note 165.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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clusion of a Zoom trial in the Middle District of Florida spoke positively to her about the experience.178
Whether the use of virtual civil trials will increase during the pandemic and beyond is an open question. Commentators have suggested
that although virtual civil trials are a rarity, they may be needed even
after the United States has reached herd immunity with respect to
COVID-19 as a way to work through case backlogs without sacrificing
public access to trials.179 At the time of this writing, it has been reported that at least five other federal civil trials have been scheduled,
including in the Middle District of Minnesota, the District of Kansas,
and the District of Rhode Island.180 A “how-to” seminar on virtual
civil trials, hosted by the Western District of Washington, has attracted
more than 900 participants from more than sixty federal district
courts.181
C. Implications For Pandemic-Era Civil Jury Trials
The majority of commentary examining the downstream effects of
pandemic-era trial innovations has centered on criminal jury trials,
often with a laser-like focus on constitutional speedy trial guarantees
and the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.182 But it is not obvious that the policy considerations that underlie these constitutional
mandates should apply only to criminal defendants. The subjective experience of fair treatment—and the subsequent willingness of litigants
to legitimize the courts and comply with their edicts—does not turn
on whether an action is civil or criminal or if the litigant is a civil
plaintiff, a victim in a criminal action, or a civil or criminal defendant.183 Civil litigants care about their cases as much as criminal litigants do, which includes the timely adjudication of their dispute and
the right to challenge the opposing party in court. Moreover, empirical evidence suggests that procedural justice might play an outsized
role with civil plaintiffs precisely because, compared to victims testifying in a government-brought criminal action, they control the litiga178. Id.
179. See, e.g., More U.S. Courts Plan Virtual Jury Trials to Move Civil Cases, BLOOMBERG
LAW (Feb. 10, 2021, 10:57 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/more-u-s-courtsplan-virtual-jury-trials-to-move-civil-cases.
180. See As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean into Virtual Technology, supra note 165.
181. Id.
182. See, e.g., Hamilton, The Practical and Constitutional Issues, supra note 168.
183. See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 54, at 133 (discussing the range of settings demonstrating procedural justice effects).
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tion more directly and arguably have a greater stake in the dispute,
both economically and psychologically.184
Examining the role of COVID-19-era innovations in the civil courts
presents a unique set of issues at the intersection of the perceptions of
psychological distance and procedural justice that these courts produce. This section will examine these potential effects in the context of
(1) sanitized, in-person civil trials, in which the negative effects of psychological distance on perceptions of procedural justice might be
counteracted by other important relational signals that courts send litigants; and (2) in virtual trials, where it is unclear whether these negative distancing effects occur at all. By examining the competing
psychological stories that the current research produces, this Article
can serve as a research agenda for exploring these important issues
empirically.
1. In-Person Jury Trials
In-person civil jury trials resemble their pre-pandemic counterparts
in a myriad of ways. Participants are personally in the courtroom or in
a similar venue that can accommodate increased spatial needs, and the
features of the adversary system are still present and recognizable:
participants give opening statements, examine witnesses, and submit
evidence mostly in the same ways that they do in trials during ordinary times.185 Thus, the effects of these modified in-person trials on
perceptions of procedural justice should (in theory) be minimal, insofar as spatial familiarity breeds trust, a core component of procedural
justice.186 But other components of in-person civil trials, including increased social distancing, the wearing of masks or other face shields,
and even the placement of witnesses and individual jurors within the
room, may have understudied effects on public perceptions of fair
treatment, also a critical component of procedural justice.

184. See, e.g., E. Allan Lind et al., In the Eye of the Beholder: Tort Litigants’ Evaluations of
Their Experiences in the Civil Justice System, 24 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 953, 955–56 (1990).
185. See, e.g., Jennifer Oetter Secures Victory, supra note 38 (recounting an in-person civil jury
trial in a high school auditorium and noting the presence of the jury, the examination of witnesses, the presence of experts, the viewing of exhibits, and the hearings of motions, consistent
with traditional adversarial proceedings); Statement from George Willette’s attorney, supra note
33 (noting the use of trial exhibits).
186. Michael D. Baer et al., Trusting the “Look and Feel”: Situational Normality, Situational
Aesthetics, and the Perceived Trustworthiness of Organizations, 61 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1718, 1718
(2018).
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a. Masks
Psychologists have studied the social effects of mask-wearing over
the past several decades, since at least the time of Ku Klux Klan-perpetrated violence in the early-to-mid 1900s.187 Most of the research,
however, has focused on the anonymizing and deindividuating effects
of mask-wearing: the extent to which an individual experiences a loss
of a sense of self and the subsequent effects on impulse control and
disinhibition.188 Other researchers have focused on the role that
masks play in social rituals, noting how they can conceal the wearer’s
emotions and, in some circumstances, lead to groupthink and antisocial behavior.189
Modern psychological research in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, however, has examined the effect of mask usage in more intimate social contexts with intriguing results. In the most relevant
recent study, published in JAMA Surgery, researchers conducted a
randomized clinical trial of 200 medical patients and manipulated
whether the patients’ surgeons wore clear masks or standard covered
masks during consultations.190 Researchers then asked patients for
their feedback on various aspects of the interaction.191 To a statistically significant degree, patients found that doctors who wore clear
masks provided clearer explanations to them about their diagnosis,
demonstrated more empathy for their situation, and fostered a greater
degree of trust.192 Participants cited having a clear visualization of the
face as their primary reason for preferring clear masks to their covered counterparts.193
These findings have intriguing applications to pandemic-era civil trials. Courts have increasingly wrestled with the question of whether to
allow witnesses to testify without wearing a mask or to allow witnesses
to wear face shields or testify unmasked from another room.194 These
187. Rosie Leizrowice, How Masks Change Us: On Anonymity, Road Rage & Rituals, ROSIE
LEIZROWICE BLOG (Apr. 13, 2018), https://rosieleizrowice.medium.com/how-masks-change-uson-anonymity-road-rage-rituals-9398f587e454.
188. See, e.g., Andrew Silke, Deindividuation, Anonymity and Violence: Findings from Northern Ireland, 143 J. SOC. PSYCH. 493, 493–94 (2003).
189. Id.; see also Claus-Christian Carbon, Wearing Face Masks Strongly Confuses Counterparts in Reading Emotions, 11 FRONTIERS IN PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (2020).
190. See generally Ian M. Kratzke et al., Effect of Clear vs Standard Covered Masks on Communication with Patients During Surgical Clinic Encounters: A Randomized Clinical Trial,
156 JAMA SURGERY 372 (2021).
191. Id. at 373.
192. Id. at 374–76.
193. Id.
194. See Hamilton, Workers in L.A.’s Courts, supra note 156; see also Hong & Ransom, supra
note 156.
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findings suggest that people believe that seeing a target actor’s full
face provides additional informational value, which could affect impressions of the tribunal’s decision accuracy. But more importantly,
the wearing of a mask appears to create a level of psychological distance, to the extent that it acts as a barrier between an individual and
a target actor in the environment, and may decrease perceptions of
empathy and trustworthiness, important components of procedural
justice.
On the other hand, there are reasons to wonder whether these findings would necessarily replicate in the courtroom. The relationship between a sick patient and her surgeon is an intensely personal one,
which is likely to be qualitatively different from the more formal, less
personal relationship between a litigant and the court that hears her
case. Moreover, given the highly contagious nature of COVID-19, requiring participants to wear masks during the proceedings might itself
send an interpersonal, relational signal to litigants that the court cares
about their health and well-being, which may actually increase perceptions of procedural justice. Researchers would do well to replicate this
study in varying contexts, including legal contexts, to determine
whether the findings are externally generalizable.
b. Physical Barriers
The presence of plexiglass barriers in the courtroom, which many
courts have installed for in-person civil and criminal trials, poses similar puzzles with respect to their effects on procedural justice. Perceptually, their maze-like aesthetic may create an illusion of distance,
especially coupled with the fact that jurors are often spread out into
the gallery, spaced at least six feet apart from one another, and relatively far away from the litigants’ tables. These concerns may be exacerbated in the growing number of jurisdictions that are seconding
large high school auditoriums or public event spaces to hold trials.195
The inconveniences that plexiglass barriers impose between attorneys and their clients may also be a cause for concern with respect to
perceptions of procedural justice. One of the core components of fair
process involves the parties feeling as if they have been heard by the
tribunal—and especially that they have been heard by the agent who
represents their voice: their legal counsel.196 In many courtrooms,
195. See, e.g., Rodriguez, supra note 33.
196. Robert J. Bies & Debra L. Shapiro, Voice and Justification: Their Influence on Procedural Fairness Judgments, 31 ACADEM. MGMT. J. 676, 676 (1988) (“One of the consistent findings
of [procedural fairness] research has been that people perceive voice procedures as fairer than
mute procedures . . . even when a decision is unfavorable to them.”) (citations omitted).
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plexiglass barriers have been erected between parties at the litigants’
tables, potentially disrupting the ease of whispered communications
between client and counsel.197 Perhaps anticipating this practical concern, if not the larger legitimacy-related concern, some courts have
allowed parties to speak to their counsel through the use of headsets
and other low-volume communicative devices.198 It remains unclear as
an empirical matter whether these solutions will solve the potential
dignitary harms that difficulty communicating with counsel may produce, but they are worthy of further study.
As with masks, it is not entirely clear that physical barriers will unequivocally harm litigants’ perceptions of procedural justice. These
perceptions turn on interpersonal treatment: feeling as if one has been
treated with dignity and respect. In that sense, although the sterilized
trial setting might decrease litigants’ perceptions of being treated with
dignity and respect—to the extent that the process feels increasingly
impersonal—litigants might also see the presence of plexiglass barriers as comforting and might credit the courts for providing them with
that sense of comfort.199 Indeed, to the extent that courts are candid
with respect to the connection between their mitigation measures and
their concern for litigants’ health, psychology research suggests that
litigants’ perceptions of fair process and fair treatment may
increase.200
2. Virtual Jury Trials
Virtual civil jury trials present a different puzzle for procedural justice researchers. Like their in-person counterpart, Zoom and WebEx
trials include largely the same adversarial procedures that are the hallmark of the American justice system. But unlike in-person trials, these
procedures are, by necessity, administered in a manner that looks
quite different, which may affect the trust and fair treatment components of procedural justice that litigants experience.
Here, there are potentially two pathways through which psychological distance may exert its effects on perceptions of procedural justice.
First, most participants—including the litigants, the judge, the attorneys, the witnesses, the juries, and the court employees—are distant
from the courtroom as a matter of physical space. Second, to the ex197. See As Courts Restore Operations, COVID-19 Creates a New Normal, supra note 154.
198. Id.
199. Zara Abrams, Building a Safe Space in the Pandemic, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.apa.org/topics/covid-19/pandemic-safe-space.
200. See, e.g., Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 500, 506 (2015).
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tent that Zoom trials are unfamiliar and novel, it is possible that they
create increased psychological space as well. But, as I discuss below,
although increases in psychological distance appear to lead to lower
levels of interpersonal trust, there are theoretical reasons to wonder
whether virtual trials actually do create perceptions of psychological
space. Direct empirical evidence is lacking, but findings from other
domains, as well as anecdotal accounts of virtual social encounters
during the pandemic outside the courtroom, may prove instructive in
refining researchers’ thinking as they examine this issue empirically.
a. The Informality Problem
At the institutional level, the trust component of procedural justice
is derived in part from the normality and predictability of interactions
between an actor and a social institution.201 This predictability, in
turn, is derived from “taken-for-granted understandings” and expectations about appropriate behaviors exhibited by actors within the social
system.202 The understandings between actors and institutions can be
represented by abstract principles and concrete examples and often
include expectations about the identities, categories, modes of communication, and codes of conduct with respect to those interacting
with the institution.203 Empirical studies suggest that to the extent that
the institutional behavior violates these shared expectations, or is otherwise incongruent with a set of shared principles, perceptions of the
institution’s trustworthiness may be eroded.204 This tendency may, in
turn, be exacerbated if the medium through which the violation of
expectations occurs itself creates psychological distance between the
actor and the institution.
Scholars have written thoughtful articles about the expressive function of courtroom design and what the layout and décor of the courtroom communicate to participants in the legal system about the
nature of participatory justice.205 Individual courthouses and courtrooms invariably differ, sometimes markedly so, with respect to features, including their size, age, and aesthetic. The ornate highceilinged, marble hallways of many federal courthouses are not always
present in their state- and county-court counterparts. Nonetheless,
201. Kai Lambertz & Devasheesh P. Bhave, Employee Perceptions of Organisational Legitimacy as Impersonal Bases of Organisational Trustworthiness and Trust, 7 J. TRUST RES. 129,
129–32 (2017).
202. Id. at 129.
203. Id. at 132.
204. Id.
205. See, e.g., Linda Mulcahy, Architects of Justice: The Politics of Courtroom Design, 16 SOC.
& LEGAL STUD. 383, 383–87 (2007).
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courtrooms almost universally share certain features, with the judge
typically presiding on a raised platform, the parties facing the judge
from a distance, the testifying witness and the jury relatively close to
the judge’s side, and spectators seated farther away in the gallery. The
formality to this aesthetic mirrors the formality of the proceedings
themselves, and legal scholars have argued that the formality inherent
in increasingly partitioned, hierarchically segmented modern courtrooms conveys the seriousness of legal proceedings and the power of
the presiding judge.206
If these scholars have correctly articulated the signals that the public receives from the very design of the nation’s courthouses, then distant Zoom trials may upend those norms in a way that threatens the
public’s perceptions of procedural justice. Although—in the few civil
Zoom trial images that are publicly available—the presiding judge
wears a robe and appears to conduct the proceedings pursuant to adversarial norms, the judge is not elevated physically from other participants, and the participants are not segmented in the manner in
which they would be in an in-person proceeding.207 Moreover, with
the occasional exception (in which jurors have appeared on Zoom
with a standardized backdrop behind them), jurors have appeared on
Zoom in spaces ranging from more formal locations, like their dining
rooms, to less formal locations, including their bedrooms.208 To the
extent that litigants notice these subtle differences from in-person trials—consciously or subconsciously—and to the extent that any lack of
formality may violate litigants’ expectations, they may come to see
these trials as more psychologically distant. If so, their trust in the
tribunal, feelings of having been respected and heard, and the procedural justice that they believe they have been afforded may be
compromised.209
206. Norman W. Spaulding, The Enclosure of Justice: Courthouse Architecture, Due Process,
and the Dead Metaphor of Trial, 24 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 311, 316, 330–31 (2012).
207. See, e.g., As Pandemic Lingers, Courts Lean into Virtual Technology, supra note 165 (displaying a screenshot of a virtual civil jury trial in the Middle District of Florida, with Judge Mary
Scriven presiding over Zoom in her judicial robes).
208. See id. (including a screenshot of the virtual trial with heterogeneous juror backgrounds);
see also Marimow & Jouvenal, supra note 160 (including a screenshot of a non-binding civil trial
in which the jurors appear in front of standardized backgrounds). Although it is beyond the
scope of this Article, it is worth noting that it may prove more difficult for judges to regulate the
degree to which jurors pay attention to the proceedings during a trial conducted on Zoom. Apart
from its effects on litigants’ perceptions of the tribunal’s decision accuracy, this may cause litigants to believe that they are not being truly heard and respected by the tribunal.
209. It might be the case, however, that Zoom proceedings, despite consisting of participants
who are further away from each other spatially, produce greater feelings of familiarity, trust, and
procedural justice among participants. I address this intriguing possibility in the next Part.
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There are, however, at least two issues to consider before assuming
that virtual trials will lead to decreased perceptions of procedural justice. First, the argument assumes that the public has a clear reference
point—and therefore, clear expectations—of what one’s “day in
court” would look like. Most members of the public, however, may
not ever step foot inside a courtroom, and so the degree to which they
hold any such expectations—and the degree to which they expect
their day in court to conform strictly to those expectations—is an
open question. Nonetheless, it is worth noting the sheer volume of
popular media available for consumption that includes fictional representations of the courtroom, as well as “true crime” shows that provide access to footage from actual trials. It is not obvious that these
fictional representations create meaningful expectations in the real
world—as the research on the so-called CSI Effect appears to indicate210—but the possibility deserves further study.
Second, as with in-person trials, Zoom trials may produce countervailing relational signals to litigants. For example, in a Zoom trial, litigants, witnesses, and jurors are spared the inconvenience of traveling
to the district courthouse for the trial and are spared from routine
screening procedures and other potential annoyances. Regardless of
the ultimate outcome, participants might appreciate the court’s willingness to hold the trial virtually as a cost-saving measure for its participants in a way that signals respect for participants’ time and
resources. Moreover, the very fact that a Zoom trial is occurring at all,
instead of requiring participants to wait an uncertain amount of time
before the dispute is resolved or requiring participants to meet at the
courthouse and risk exposure to COVID-19, might also send positive
relational signals to litigants.
b. The Spatial Problem
As a matter of physical distance, the effects of virtual trials on perceptions of procedural justice are straightforward. Because virtual trials allow for substantially increased physical space between litigants
and the tribunal compared to in-person trials, several aspects of procedural justice—including feelings of trust and beliefs that litigants have
been heard—should decrease dramatically when trials are conducted
online. Some recent findings in non-legal contexts appear, to some
degree, to support this hypothesis.
210. Kimberlianne Podlas, The CSI Effect: Exposing the Media Myth, 16 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 429, 431 (2006).
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For example, some state prison systems, citing budgetary and safety
concerns, have chosen to employ remote video visitation sessions in
place of in-person visitation of inmates.211 Criminologists Grant Duwe
and Susan McNeeley examined, in one such jurisdiction, the effects of
the shift toward virtual visitation on several aspects of prisoner wellbeing and behavior.212 The researchers compared over 800 participants who experienced virtual visitation sessions against a matched
sample from the general prison population and found that, although
video visitation was associated with select positive behavioral outcomes, it did not improve key behavioral and well-being metrics, such
as violent recidivism outcome rates.213 The data comports with anecdotal accounts in the popular press and qualitative interviews that suggest that participants find virtual visitations distancing and isolating, in
part because of the inability to see each other’s full body, the poor
quality of the video feed, and the lack of eye contact on account of the
placement of the camera.214
But there are several reasons to question whether holding virtual
civil trials would have the same interpersonal effects. It may be that
although participants in Zoom trials are physically farther away from
one another, the trials are experienced as closer psychologically compared to sanitized trials with more anonymizing, formalistic features.
If so, then Zoom trials may actually increase perceptions of procedural
justice.
One instructive non-legal context that researchers might consider
exploring involves online law school teaching during the pandemic.
Like the courtroom, the law school classroom has similar formalistic
features, with the instructor at a podium at the front of the room engaging in Socratic dialogue with students, not unlike how a judge
might interact with legal counsel. In a recent article in The New
Yorker, Professor Jeannie Suk Gersen discussed her impressions of
the interpersonal experience that teaching on Zoom provided to both

211. See, e.g., Dropped Connections: The Barriers to Communication Created by Video Visitation, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. (Mar. 15, 2018), https://harvardcrcl.org/dropped-connections-thebarriers-to-communication-created-by-video-visitation/ (discussing video visitation in prisons
and noting that “the benefits cited are lower security costs to the correctional facility and the
convenience of video visitation”).
212. Grant Duwe & Susan McNeeley, Just As Good As the Real Thing? The Effects of Prison
Video Visitation on Recidivism, 67 CRIME & DELINQ. 475, 476 (2021).
213. Id. at 475.
214. See, e.g., Prison Visits Crucial, but Miles and Money Separate Families, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Jan. 10, 2017, 7:00 PM), https://www.nola.com/news/crime_police/article_25d54766-782e5f6a-8a0c-23eb288c0cc9.html.
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her and her students.215 She noted the egalitarian aesthetic of Zoom,
insofar as the hierarchical geography of the law school classroom is
replaced by “Brady Bunch”-esque, equally-sized squares in which participants appear, often in close-up.216 Suk Gersen commented specifically on the intimacy of online teaching, in part because of Zoom’s
ability to capture students’ facial expressions more closely and clearly
than the participants would be able to see in the classroom, while also
noting the comparative ease with which students participated in the
Socratic dialogue, attributing the difference to students’ greater familiarity with communicating via videoconferencing software.217 These
potentially humanizing elements of Zoom, including the ability to see
participants’ bedrooms and an occasional relative or pet milling about
in the background, allowed her class to have a more personal feel,
which she noted was reflected in various points of discussion throughout the semester.218 Suk Gersen’s anecdotal account appears consistent with emerging psychological findings, which suggest that
“hyperaccessibility” of digital media may reduce felt distance between
social actors separated by geographical space, provided that there is
enough “conceptual” similarity between the online activity and its inperson counterpart.219
Although the courtroom is similar to the law school classroom in
many respects, it is not a perfect analogy. Law school professors serve
a mentoring role for law students that is not present in the courtroom
setting, and the sometimes-adversarial nature of the Socratic dialogue
in law school instruction pales in comparison to the “rough and tumble” of the adversary system during civil litigation. But cognitive psychologists might nonetheless find it useful to examine which of these
features of videoconferencing—structural and psychological—are the
most salient to potential litigants. Particularly, in light of research that
suggests that perceptions of psychological distance and procedural justice in online interactions may be subject to generational and cultural
moderators,220 this line of research might prove particularly fruitful in
215. See generally Jeannie Suk Gersen, Finding Real Life in Teaching Law Online, THE NEW
YORKER (Apr. 23, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/culture/personal-history/finding-real-lifein-teaching-law-online.
216. Id.
217. . Id.
218. Id.
219. Norman et al., supra note 122, at 1–2.
220. See, e.g., Ophillia Ledimo, An Assessment of Organisational Justice Perceptions across
Three Generational Cohorts, 4 J. GOVERNANCE & REG. 69, 74–77 (2015). The results suggest
that millennials appear more attuned to the formal processes of procedural justice, while older
generations are more attuned to interactional aspects of procedural justice. Id.
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providing a framework for understanding procedural justice in virtual
trials.
V. FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
With the arrival of COVID-19 vaccines in early 2021, the public
health threat posed by the pandemic appears to be slowly ebbing, and
with it, the necessity of the procedural innovations introduced during
the height of the public health crisis. But there is reason to believe
that at least some of these innovations—with respect to at least some
virtual hearings—may outlive the pandemic for reasons of both administrative convenience and cost. Policymakers would do well to remember the strong explanatory power that fair procedures and fair
treatment have with respect to the public’s willingness to legitimize
the courts and follow their directives. Researchers, for their part,
would do well to confront what procedural justice might look like, and
how it might evolve, in an increasingly digital age in an increasingly
distant global economy.
Currently, there are conflicting psychological stories that researchers could tell with respect to COVID-19-era procedural innovations
that point in competing directions for governing policy. To the extent
that increased psychological distance interacts with interpersonal factors—such as trust—to lower perceptions of perceived fairness in social interactions, is this effect mitigated in sanitized, in-person trials by
the message the tribunal sends regarding its commitment to litigant
safety? In virtual trials, does the videoconferencing software actually
create the psychological feeling of distance that threatens perceptions
of fairness? These are testable questions that psychologists have the
tools to answer. Indeed, the pandemic has created a pseudo-natural
experiment in which researchers, to the extent that courts will allow
them to do so, could survey participants on traditional dimensions of
procedural justice and compare the data with publicly available data
from appropriately matched litigants and jurors during normal
times.221
This research could then establish a framework for exciting questions about the future of these procedural innovations. For example,
although there do not appear to be generational differences in the
desire for procedural justice (or with respect to its effects on perceptions of institutional legitimacy), research does suggest that different
221. See, e.g., PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., ARE HUNG JURIES A PROBLEM 2 (2002),
https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/199372.pdf (examining, before the COVID-19 pandemic,
empirical procedural justice questions in the context of hung jury cases in a natural experiment
paradigm).
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generations have different thresholds and conditions under which they
perceive procedures to be fair.222 This may mean that younger generations adapt to and accept some aspects of virtual litigation more readily compared to their older counterparts, and that a “red queen” effect
might result from the constant evolution of technology, on one hand,
and the increasing technological proficiency of younger generations
on the other.223
Researchers may also consider the extent to which the stakes of the
matter being litigated affect perceptions of psychological distance and
procedural justice. Several countries outside of the United States routinely allow citizens to submit smaller claims to courts online, obviating the need for attorneys or the expense of attending court.224
Although research suggests that the public expects procedures to be
fair even in small-stakes interactions,225 the relative convenience of
these methods may send relational signals that increase public perceptions of fair process. This may have increasing relevance for certain
low-level disputes—including traffic violations—that the public may
be particularly inclined to resolve virtually if provided the
opportunity.
***
George Willette, Cheryl Staple, and the family of Phillip White
brought forth vastly different civil actions during the COVID-19 pandemic. The litigants, however, have at least one thing in common: an
expectation that the civil jury system will treat them fairly and will use
fair procedures to resolve their claims. These cases took drastically
different procedural paths, and it is an open question whether those
paths produced “justice” in the eyes of both the litigants who tried the
cases, and in the eyes of the public that will decide whether to legitimize the tribunals that heard those cases. Psychologists have an important role to play in assisting policymakers in ensuring that legal
tribunals exercise authority over the public in a manner that aligns
222. See generally Ledimo, supra note 220.
223. In evolutionary biology, the red queen hypothesis posits that organisms constantly struggle to keep up with one another in the context of evolutionary developments between predator
and prey. See Leigh Van Valen, A New Evolutionary Law, 1 EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 1, 17–21
(1973). The hypothesis is named after a character in Lewis Carroll’s novel, Through the Looking
Glass, who, in a memorable scene, runs as quickly as she can only to remain in the same place.
See LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS (1872).
224. See, e.g., REMOTE COURTS WORLDWIDE, https://remotecourts.org/ (last visited Jan. 18,
2022) (containing databases and articles on the approaches to online justice in various
countries).
225. See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper et al., Procedural Justice in Felony Cases, 22 LAW & SOC’Y.
REV. 483, 503–04 (1988).
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with both the substantive and procedural values of the citizenry. In
doing so, these policymakers will strengthen the popular legitimacy of
the courts as technology and cultural understandings of justice continue to evolve.
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